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RECENT CASE NOTES
A license is merely a permission to enter upon or do an act on land of
another which without such permission would amount to a trespass.
Clifford v. O'Neill, 42 N. Y. Supp. 607, 609. The officers had no right to
enter the defendant's house without a license express or implied. A license
to enter on property of another may be implied from the acts of the
parties, from their relations, and from custom. Gravelly Ford Canal Co. V.
Pope & Talbot Land Co., 36 Cal. App. 717, 178 Pac. 155. A license may
be inferred from the circumstances of the case. Harmon v. Ha'mon, 61
Me. 222. Thus a license may be implied to enable one to enter on another's
land if he goes there in order to transact business of the nature carried on
there, Cutler v. Smith, 57 Ill. 252. There is also an apparent extension of
this doctrine which says that a license may be implied to enter the house
of another at a usual and reasonable hour for any of the common purposes
of life. Lakin v. Ames, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 198. Such a license may not be
inferred from equivocal declarations or acts. Falls City Lumber Co. 'o.
Watkibs, 53 Ore. 212, 99 Pac. 884.
Unfortunately there are no reasoned opinions of the Indiana courts
on the precise point involved in this case but the above decisions seem to
represent the weight of modern authority on this subject. The court in
this case apparently held that the selling of whisky was a business carried
on on the premises and that a voluntary opening of the door on a request
for the commodity sold there constituted an implied invitation to enter.
It may be argued in answer to the court's line of reasoning that the ult:mate motive of the visit of the officers was not to buy whisky but to find
whisky and to make an arrest if such whisky was found. On such premise it would be more difficult to find an implied invitation to enter. The
court here seemed to base its decision on consideration of all the circumstances of the case and on that basis the case is no doubt sound. At least
the question is kept as one of fact inference. To extend the doctrine of
implied licenses much beyond that announced in this case, however, would
be treading on dangerous ground.
T. H. F.
TRUSTS-RESULTING TRUSTS-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE-The amended
complaint alleges that, in the year 1902, plaintiff and one Elder (defendant's deceased husband) entered into a verbal agreement whereby they were
to contribute equally to a fund which was to be held in trust by Elder for
the purchase of certain real estate; that the agreement was without fraudulent intent and each agreed to contribute one-half of the fund. Plaintiff
alleges that each contributed three hundred dollars in money and twelve
hundred dollars in mining stock, and Elder became trustee for himself and
plaintiff. Elder later purchased land with the fund and took title in his
own name in trust, it is alleged, for plaintiff and himself. Title remained
in Elder until he died in 1918. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant is the
sole beneficiary under Elder's will and that she holds title to this land in
trust for herself and plaintiff. The prayer is for partition. At the trial
there was no direct evidence of any contract between plaintiff and Elder
for the purchase of the land in question and no evidence as to how much,
if any, money was put in Elder's hands by plaintiff for the purchase of
this land, nor when such was paid. There was some evidence of Elder's
obtaining a loan on the property and that it was stated in the application
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for the loan that the property was owned by plaintiff and Elder in fee and
that the loan was carried in the name of plaintiff and Elder. Judgment
below was for defendant on the ground that no resulting trust existed
between plaintiff and Elder in the latter's lifetime in respect of the property, and no trust relation has since existed between plaintiff and defendant. Held: Judgment affirmed. Burns' Ann. St. 1926, Sec. 13447, provides: "When a conveyance for a valuable consideration is made to one
person and the consideration therefor is paid by another, no trust shall
result in favor of the latter, but title shall vest in the former subject to
the provisions of the next sections." And Sec. 13449 provides: "The
provisions of 13447 shall not extend to cases where it appears, by agreement, and without fraudulent intent, the party to whom the conveyance
was made or in whom the title shall vest, was to hold the land in trust
for the party paying the purchase price." There was not sufficient evidence, under the statute, to show that Elder agreed to hold the land in
trust for plaintiff. Kemp v. Elder, Appellate Court of Indiana, February
21, 1930, 170 N. E. 90.
A resulting trust must arise at or before the time of the conveyance.
Westerfield v. Kimmer, 82 Ind. 365; Toney v. Wend lind, 138 Ind. 228;
Hughes v. White, 117 Ind. 470.
In order to create a resulting trust under these sections of the statutes,
the purchase money must be paid at the time of or before the conveyance
is made. A resulting trust can not be created by funds subsequently
furnished. Toney v. Wendlind, supra; People's Bank and Trust Co. v.
Mills, 193 Ind. 131; Rickes v. Rickes, 81 Ind. App. 533.
In the principal case there was no evidence that plaintiff furnished any
of the purchase money at or before the purchase of the land by Elder.
Nor was there any evidence of what portion, if any, of the purchase price
was paid by plaintiff. Elder's will and the probate thereof is a disavowal
of any trust in respect of the land.
Where part payment of the purchase money is claimed the exact portion should be clearly shown. Hulton v. Cunningham, 28 Ind. App. 295;
Irwin v. Ivers, 7 Ind. 308.
In view of the evidence, the case is clearly correct under the statutes.
R. C. H.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER CONTRACTS--CONDITIONS-In 1916 H. McCool,

in writing, agreed to convey to the defendants certain real estate. The
agreement provided that the conveyance should be made when the defendants had paid the full purchase price and interest, payments to be made as
follows: $14 at the signing of the agreement and $14 in advance each
month until the full purchase price, with interest at 6% was paid. Time
of payment was made of the essence of the contract, and, on failure of the
defendants to promptly make the payments or to perform any of their covenants, the contract, at the option of the vendors, was to be forfeited and
determined. In 1927 McCool transferred the property and sales agreement to the plaintiff. At this time the defendants were in default in their
payments. Payments had been made irregularly and in irregular amounts
long after they were due. Ten days before the commencement of this
suit, the plaintiff called at the home of the defendants and demanded pos-

